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We are not Englishmen, who in India strive by no means to mingle with 
the native races and who for this reason, sooner or later, may pay with 
the loss of that country, where they will have no ties of relationship; our 
strength, by contrast, up until now has consisted in that we assimilated 
the defeated peoples, blending with them peacefully. 
—Mikhail Veniukov1 
Russia's supposedly ambivalent identity between Europe and Asia long 
exercised a peculiar fascination for historians seeking to understand the 
nature of Russian imperialism. In the 19th century, an era when it is often 
assumed that biological racism and the creation of difference were becoming 
a universal justification for colonial rule, the Russian Empire was seen, 
and has continued to be seen, as an intriguing exception. As the opening 
quotation from the famous military geographer Mikhail Veniukov suggests, 
there has never been any shortage of those prepared to claim that Russian 
imperialism was distinctively tolerant and assimilationist when contrasted 
with the imperialism of the other European powers. Ideas of pan-Asian 
kinship and a seeming lack of political privileges for Russians suggested that 
access to power was determined largely by social status rather than ethnicity 
or religion, with the Russians themselves becoming the victims of their own 
imperial enterprise.2 The existence of an "Asianist" imagined geography 
of the empire appeared to set Russian imperial culture apart from that of 
The debt which this paper owes to the work of other scholars will be obvious—it is not a 
piece of original research, merely an attempt at synthesis. I would like to thank Mike Hughes, 
Catriona Kelly, Norihiro Naganawa, Tomohiko Uyama, Paul Werth, and the anonymous re-
viewers of Kritika for their valuable advice and suggestions. 
1 M . I . Veniukov, "Postupatel'noe dvizhenie Rossii v Srednei Azii," Sbornik gosudarstvennykh 
znanii, 3, ed. V. P. Bezobrazov (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1877), 61. 
2 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1558—1917 (London: HarperCollins, 1997). 
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Britain or France.3 The most common alternative to this view of Russian 
imperialism was nationalist historiography which described the empire and 
its Soviet successor as a "prison of peoples," or at the very least understood 
Russia's imperial history as a series of separate national historiographies.4 
Both sides of this debate were heavily influenced by emigre writings, from 
the self-indulgent fantasies of the "Eurasianists" to the polemics produced by 
disappointed Ukrainian, Georgian, or Tatar exiles, who claimed that a brief 
moment of national independence had been crushed by a new and still darker 
form of Russian imperialism.5 While the latter school at least acknowledged 
the empire's diversity and tried to give a (very partial) idea of what had 
destroyed the tsarist regime, neither made any real attempt to understand 
how it had functioned and held together for so long, beyond invoking either 
mystic geographical determinism or the use of force. Above all, perhaps, both 
approaches privileged the study of identity through the written products of 
high culture at the expense of making serious attempts to understand how 
such a vast polity was governed. 
The "imperial turn" in both Russian and Western scholarship since 
the early 1990s (prompted in large part by the opening up of provincial 
archives in the former USSR, which finally allowed Western historians to 
do serious empirical research on Russian rule over non-Russians) has seen an 
extraordinary blossoming of works that increasingly try to understand the 
empire on its own terms.6 Dominic Lieven's and Kimitaka Matsuzato's calls for 
a greater focus on the reasons for imperial cohesion, rather than the artificially 
divided "national" historiographies that emerged between the 1970s and the 
1990s, has been widely answered; and recent scholarship has placed a greater 
and welcome emphasis on exploring the empire's territorial divisions and 
administration and on the plurality of regional approaches to governance.7 
3 Mark Bassin, "Geographies of Imperial Identity," in Cambridge History of Russia, ed. 
Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2:60—63. 
4 The series of "national" histories of the Tatars, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc., produced by the 
Hoover Institution were perhaps the preeminent example of this. 
5 On "Eurasianism," see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "The Emergence of Eurasianism," California 
Slavic Studies 4 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 39—72; and Marlene Laruelle, 
L'ideologie eurasiste russe, ou Comment penser l'Empire (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1999). For many 
years, the most influential "nationalist" interpretation of Russian imperialism was Richard 
Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954, 
repr. 1964 and 1997). 
6 From the Editors, "The Imperial Turn," Kritika 7, 4 (2006): 705—12. 
7 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals (London: John Murray, 2000); 
Kimitaka Matsuzato, "Introduction," in Imperiology: From Empirical Knowledge to Discussing 
the Russian Empire, ed. Matsuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), 12—13. 
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Perhaps the most prominent and ambitious example of this new trend is a 
collective volume edited by Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi 
Remnev, which offers a rich variety of perspectives on the peoples, places, and 
hierarchies of the Russian Empire.8 Not one of the contributions to this book, 
however, deals with the Russian Empire's most obviously colonial region, 
Central Asia. This is a serious omission: Turkestan and the steppe cannot be 
viewed as uncharacteristic administrative anomalies which somehow do not 
fit an alternative, all-Russian pattern. Central Asia is too important both to 
late imperial thinking about Russia as a colonial power, and to the experience 
of the empire's largest religious minority, its Muslims (most of whom lived 
there), not to be at the center of any analysis of Russian imperialism.9 This 
article aims to engage with and revise some of the conclusions of this debate 
by approaching it from a Central Asian perspective. Seen from the empire's 
remotest and most "un-Russian" region, many of the controversies regarding 
imperial policy at the center seem at best irrelevant and at worst misleading. 
Regional studies of Islam in the Russian Empire have a tendency to take 
the Volga—Ural region as the norm for Muslim interaction with the tsarist 
state, from which other regions deviate, or else to assume that the pattern 
established there was simply reproduced elsewhere.10 Elena Campbell's article 
on the "Muslim Question" in late imperial Russia is typical of this tendency: 
though it is a reasonable description of late imperial debates surrounding 
the Tatars of Kazan province, it takes these as characteristic of the empire as 
a whole.11 In concentrating on opinions within the Ministry of the Interior 
and among Orthodox missionaries, it almost entirely ignores the views of the 
military. Yet 60 percent of the empire's Muslims—in the steppe, the North 
Caucasus, and Central Asia—lived in provinces under military rule, where 
they did not fall under the jurisdiction of the spiritual assemblies in Orenburg, 
Transcaucasia, and Crimea, the structures of the "confessional state" that have 
formed the focus of most recent research on the tsarist state's relationship 
8 Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., Russian Empire: Space, People, 
Power, 1700—1930 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007). 
9 The volume that best fills this sizable gap is Tomohiko Uyama, ed., Empire, Islam, and 
Politics in Central Eurasia (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007). 
10 Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Crews, "An Empire for the Faithful, 
a Colony for the Dispossessed," in Le Turkestan russe: Une colonie comme les autres? ed. S. 
Gorshenina and S. Abashin (Cahiers d'Asie centrale, no. 17/18) (Tashkent and Paris: IFEAC, 
2009): 82—83. 
11 Elena Campbell, "The Muslim Question in Late Imperial Russia," in Russian Empire, 
320^7. 
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with Islam.12 If there was such a thing as Russian citizenship, then they were 
clearly excluded from it. 
As Yanni Kotsonis has observed, " I f citizenship is understood as the 
endowment of rights on an individual basis, balanced by duties for which one 
is individually responsible, then the imperial order of estates and autocratic 
rule was inhospitable terrain for the development of the modern practices of 
citizenship."13 He and others have argued convincingly that the concept is, 
nevertheless, useful for historians of the Russian Empire, if only because the 
vocabulary of citizenship was used so extensively by state and private actors 
in the 19th century.14 That this liberal vocabulary was not always a good way 
of describing the actual relationship between the state and its inhabitants 
is certainly true. It is no less true that the recognition of cultural diversity, 
combined with legal and administrative pluralism which some scholars have 
recently identified as characteristic of Russian "citizenship," in practice tell us 
more about the necessities of governance than about citizenship per se.15 As 
an aspiration, however, citizenship remained important for both bureaucratic 
reformers and members of the intelligentsia, and its impact can clearly be seen 
both in the period of the Great Reforms and in the fierce political debates of 
the early 1900s. 
This article does not seek to establish a conceptual definition of what 
citizenship meant in tsarist Russia. Although until its demise in 1917 the tsarist 
regime did not extend even to the majority of its European subjects those rights 
that Western historians normally associate with "citizenship," I am not seeking 
to measure citizenship in the Russian Empire either against an abstract ideal or 
against the West. Instead this article is concerned with the relative inequalities 
that existed between different categories of subject and territory and the 
parallels between inequalities in Russia and in other European empires. For this 
purpose, what matters are not the absolute rights that Russian citizens enjoyed 
or the duties they had to bear, but the extent to which these differed from those 
who were placed outside this category. I argue that from the 1860s onward, 
and in some respects before, Russia saw the creation of legal and administrative 
12 V. O. Bobrovnikov, "Islam in the Russian Empire," Cambridge History of Russia, 2:210—17. 
The proportion is calculated according to the 1897 census data given in Andreas Kappeler, The 
Russian Empire: A Multi-Ethnic History (London: Longmans, 2001), 397—99. 
13 Yanni Kotsonis, " ' Face-to-Face': The State, the Individual, and the Citizen in Russian 
Taxation, 1863—1917," Slavic Review 63, 2 (2004): 221. 
1 4 See the essays in Kritika 7, 3 (2006), "Subjecthood and Citizenship, Part I I : From Alexander 
II to Brezhnev"; and Joseph C. Bradley, "Subjects into Citizens: Societies, Civil Society, and 
Autocracy in Tsarist Russia," American Historical Review 107, 4 (2002): 1094—1123. 
15 This criticism is made strongly by Timothy Snyder, "The Elusive Civic Subject in Russian 
History," Kritika 7, 3 (2006): 609—17. 
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differences that offer some parallels to the division between metropole and 
colony seen in the British and French empires. 
Despite the exaggerated claims that are sometimes made for the importance 
of the "Asian" imagining of empire in Russia, Asianism had little impact on 
the way the empire was ruled or on the imagination of most of its officials.16 
Rhetorical claims to kinship with subject peoples and territories of the kind 
made by Veniukov could also be found in the French and British empires 
(one of the most prominent being the notion of "Aryan brotherhood," 
which also had considerable currency in Russia), and they tell us little about 
the reality of colonial rule.17 Kinship could sometimes be just as useful as the 
establishment of "difference" between ruling and subject peoples in justifying 
the maintenance of empire.18 This point is often overlooked by scholars 
in the quest to identify and excoriate the biological racism, Orientalism, 
social Darwinism, and other —isms that were employed by 19th-century 
thinkers, administrators, soldiers, and churchmen to excuse, defend, or 
strengthen imperialism by demonstrating the manifest inferiority of subject 
peoples and their unfitness to govern themselves.19 For the British and 
French in particular, the need to justify ruling over Asian and African peoples 
16 For an early critique of the notion that Russia has a uniquely inclusive or tolerant relationship 
with Asia, see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Asia through Russian Eyes," in Russia and Asia, ed. 
Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), 3—29. See further Jeff 
Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society in Tashkent (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 
5; Adeeb Khalid, "Culture and Power in Colonial Turkestan," in Le Turkestan russe, 418. 
1 7 F. Max Miiller, Lectures on the Science of Language Delivered at the Royal Institution of Great 
Britain in April, May, andJune 1861 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1861), 1:199; Joan 
Leopold, "The Aryan Theory of Race," Indian Economic and Social History Review 7 (1970): 
271—97; T. R. Trautmann, Aryans and British India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997); Tony Ballantyne, Orientalism and Race: Aryanism in the British Empire (Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Marlene Laruelle, Mythe aryen et reve imperial dans la Russie 
duXIXesiecle (Paris: Editions CNRS, 2005). 
18 Joan Leopold, "British Applications of the Aryan Theory of Race to India, 1850—1870," 
English Historical Review 89, 352 (1974): 592. It is instructive to compare Veniukov's writings 
on Central Asia with those of the legal anthropologist Henry Maine on India: Veniukov, 
"Postupatel'noe dvizhenie Rossii v Srednei Azii," 60; Henry Sumner Maine, Lectures on the 
Early History of Institutions (London: John Murray, 1880), 18—19. Both use the idea of "Aryan 
kinship" as a justification for conquest and European domination in Asia. 
19 Ann Laura Stoler, "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the 
Cultural Politics of Exclusion in South-East Asia," in Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in 
a Bourgeois World, ed. Stoler and Frederick Cooper (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1997), 198—237. 
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without their consent became acute in the 19th century because it stood in 
increasingly stark contrast to the way they conducted government at home. 
So long as empires were ruled by dynasties and despots, with little or no 
differentiation of political rights between metropole and colony, there was 
little need for such strategies. After the American and French revolutions, the 
idea that government should be by consent of the populace helped accelerate 
the move toward the nation-state, where political, linguistic, and cultural 
boundaries were supposed to coincide. But the 19th century was as much, 
if not more, a century of empires—of large, multi-ethnic polities, often with 
varying hierarchies of political rights.20 This presented a dilemma to political 
thinkers across the spectrum, but particularly to those of a radical or liberal 
persuasion who believed in the universal rights and brotherhood of man. 
Some became committed anti-imperialists, but many more found ingenious 
ways of drawing boundaries around the democratic political community, 
at the same time preserving democracy at "home," in the metropole, but 
denying it to those in the colonies over which an increasingly democratic 
government exercised control. In 1837, Alexis de Tocqueville advocated 
distinct legal and political systems for settlers and Muslims in Algeria. Initially 
he had envisaged this distinction as a temporary measure "until two peoples 
different in civilization should fuse into a single whole."21 Already by 1841, 
however, the 19th century's most famous writer on democracy and society had 
concluded that, while European settlers could and should be granted the rights 
of French citizens, the Muslims of North Africa would never form a part of 
the French political nation: 
The fusion of these two populations [Muslim and Christian] is a chimera 
that people dream of only when they have not been to these places. There 
can, therefore, and there must, be two very distinct legislative systems in 
Africa, because there are two very separate societies there. When it comes 
to the Europeans, nothing absolutely prevents us from treating them as 
though they were alone, since the rules that we make for them never 
have to apply to anyone but them. 2 2 
20 The standard modern narrative of the demise of empire and the rise of the nation-state is 
subjected to a sustained and effective critique in Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires 
in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). See also "Interview with Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper," Ab Imperio, no. 
2 (2010): 22—45. 
21 Alexis de Tocqueville, "Lettre sur l'Algerie" (1837), in Tocqueville sur l'Algerie, ed. S. L. 
Boulbina (Paris: Flammarion, 2003), 56. 
22 Alexis de Tocqueville, "Essay on Algeria" (1841), in Writings on Empire and Slavery, ed. and 
trans. Jennifer Pitts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 111; de Tocqueville, 
"Travail sur l'Algerie" (1841), in Tocqueville sur l'Algerie, 168. 
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Despite continuing rhetoric about "assimilation," this would remain true of 
French imperialism until its dying years after World War I I , with only a tiny 
elite ever becoming evolue and gaining French citizenship.23 
What was true of French imperialism was still truer of the British 
Empire, within whose complex web of dominions, protectorates, and 
crown colonies there was one fairly consistent pattern. In theory, all the 
inhabitants of the empire were subjects of the Crown, and not citizens at 
all, but in practice, the populations of the metropole, the self-governing 
white-majority dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and later 
the white-minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, enjoyed political 
rights which the so-called "tropical" colonies did not have. Although 
ostensibly applying to particular territories, the boundaries of imperial 
citizenship coincided closely with those of race. As the politician and 
historian Thomas Babington Macaulay put it in a speech to Parliament on 
the renewal of the East India Company's charter in 1833: 
We have to solve one of the hardest problems in politics. We are trying 
to make brick without straw, to bring a clean thing out of an unclean, 
to give a good government to a people to whom we cannot give a free 
government. In this country, in any neighbouring country, it is easy to 
frame securities against oppression. In Europe, you have the materials 
of good government everywhere ready to your hands. The people 
are everywhere perfectly competent to hold some share, not in every 
country an equal share, but some share of political power. If the question 
were, what is the best mode of securing good government in Europe? the 
merest smatterer in politics would answer, representative institutions. In 
India you cannot have representative institutions. Of all the innumerable 
speculators who have offered their suggestions on Indian politics, not a 
single one, as far as I know, however democratical his opinions may be, 
has ever maintained the possibility of giving, at the present time, such 
institutions to India. 2 4 
Macaulay's caveat, "at the present time," was important: as a Utilitarian 
radical and evangelical Christian, he did not believe that Indians were 
essentially incapable of coping with representative government, merely that it 
would take many years of just laws, enlightened education, and true religion 
to override centuries of backwardness and produce that "class of persons 
23 Martin Deming Lewis, "One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The 'Assimilation Theory' 
in French Colonial Policy," Comparative Studies in Society and History 4, 2 (1962): 129—53; 
Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 38—65. 
2 4 Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Government of India (10th July 1833)," in The Speeches of 
Lord Macaulay, Corrected by Himself (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1860), 135. 
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Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and 
intellect," which he saw as an ultimate goal of British rule.25 Though milder 
than the biological racism which became more common toward the end of 
the 19th century, this developmental justification for differential political 
rights, if indefinitely prolonged, could be just as effective. Seventy years later, 
the Liberal parliamentarian and historian James Bryce revealed how the two 
ideas were combined when he spoke of the distinction within the empire 
between the white dominions and those areas "where we deem that this 
native population is not qualified by its racial characteristics and by its state of 
education and enlightenment to work self-governing institutions."26 Ironically 
enough, it was only two years later that the British were compelled to give 
limited recognition to growing Indian political ambitions by introducing 
provincial elected assemblies under the Morley—Minto Reforms. 
Indians (but not Britons) born in British India were legally "non-European 
Natural-born British Subjects," while those born in the princely states were 
merely "British Protected Persons." In neither case did they have anything 
approaching a common citizenship with those born in the metropole. This 
attracted increasing criticism from a new generation of Indian politicians, 
who attacked the system of government in India by pointing to the Crown's 
own commitment in the proclamation of sovereignty over the subcontinent 
in 1858, which stated: "We hold ourselves bound to the Natives of our Indian 
territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other 
subjects." (The system of government that actually existed in India is better 
described as military despotism tempered by law.) 
The introduction of English education, with its great, noble, elevating, 
and civilising literature and advanced science, will for ever remain a 
monument of good work done in India and a claim to gratitude upon 
the Indian people. This education has taught the highest political ideal 
of British citizenship and raised in the hearts of the educated Indians 
the hope and aspiration to be able to raise their countrymen to the same 
ideal citizenship. This hope and aspiration as their greatest good are at 
the bottom of all their present sincere and earnest loyalty, in spite of the 
disappointments, discouragements, and despotism of a century and half.27 
25 Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Minute on Indian Education" (1835), in The Great Indian 
Education Debate: Documents Relating to the Orientalist—Anglicist Controversy, ed. Lynn 
Zastoupil and Martin Moir (Richmond: Curzon, 1999), 171. 
26 James Bryce, "Some Difficulties in Colonial Government Encountered by Great Britain 
and How They Have Been Met," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
30 (1907): 19. 
2 7 Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (London: Swan Sonnenschein and 
Co., 1901), vi. 
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Civis Britannicus sum—the idea that a British subject had certain rights 
that would be upheld and enforced by his government around the world, 
invoked by Palmerston with reference to the Don Pacifico affair in 1860—was 
a powerful but two-edged ideology of empire.28 Dadabhai Naoroji was a living 
example of the paradoxes of British imperial citizenship: an Indian elected to 
Parliament as the Liberal MP for Finsbury in 1892 (by five votes), but who 
could not aspire to a similar position of democratically bestowed authority in 
his own country. In some ways, this could be represented as a triumph over 
the racial hierarchies of the British Empire, exemplified in Lord Salisbury's 
comment, made during Naoroji's earlier attempt at election in 1886, that the 
electors of Holborn were not yet ready to choose a "black man." As Antoinette 
Burton has shown, the public furor that followed Salisbury's remark actually 
tended to reify certain racial categories. The crucial points were that Naoroji 
was not black, that Asians were superior to Africans, and that while the latter 
were not the equals of Europeans, Naoroji was a gentleman and deserved to 
be treated as such. The incident may subsequently have helped him secure 
election in 1892.29 During his three-year tenure as an MP, Naoroji attempted 
to turn Westminster into a truly imperial parliament that could represent 
India's interests as well as those of the British public, but he was stymied— 
not by racism as such but by the general indifference MPs showed toward 
imperial affairs. 
A few years later, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi would discover that 
in England he could to some extent be accepted as an equal, enroll at the 
Inns of Court and qualify as a barrister, and even narrowly escape being 
married off to an English girl, yet still find the boundaries of color rigid on 
the train to Pretoria, where any appeal to a common imperial citizenship was 
futile.30 Even so, when the Second Boer War broke out in 1899, he wrote: 
" I f I demanded rights as a British citizen, it was also my duty, as such, to 
participate in the defence of the British Empire," and he famously served as a 
stretcher-bearer at the battle of Spion Kop, together with many other Indians 
whom he had persuaded to join him. 3 1 The idea that the rights and liberties of 
Britons should be extended to other subjects of the empire was almost the first 
rhetorical weapon to be employed by the Indian nationalist movement, not 
2 8 Daniel Gorman, Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), 13-14. 
29 Antoinette Burton, "Tongues Untied: Lord Salisbury's 'Black Man' and the Boundaries of 
Imperial Democracy," Comparative Studies in Society and History 42, 3 (2000): 632—61. 
30 M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth (Ahmedabad: 
Navajivan Trust, 1927), 58—62, 103—4. 
3 1 Ibid., 198. 
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least because the superiority of British political institutions had so often been 
advanced as a justification for imperial rule. Gandhi and other nationalist 
leaders would campaign against the color bar and the use of indentured labor 
in South Africa under the banner of an organization called "The Imperial 
Citizenship Association."32 On its own, of course, this was never enough; and 
by the 1920s, the Indian nationalist movement was appealing to much more 
radical ideas, many of which were not of British origin. Still, it would never 
lose its parliamentary, democratic form. The flip side of the failure of the early 
Indian nationalists to persuade the British to accept them as equal citizens 
was the failure of projects for an imperial citizenship that would have united 
the white settlers in the Dominions with the Mother Country, advanced by 
the likes of John Buchan or Lionel Curtis.33 
On the face of it, the tsarist regime was never presented with a similar political 
dilemma. Burbank and von Hagen suggest that Russia was not drawn fully 
into the "imperial tension" between empire and ideals of equal citizenship, 
and that this constitutes an important distinction between "bourgeois" and 
"absolutist" empires.34 If this tension was absent, it was in part because the 
Russian nation remained so ill-defined. Andrei Zorin and Nathaniel Knight 
have argued that Count Sergei Uvarov's notion of "Official Nationality" 
or narodnost', which was one of the three pillars of the new state ideology 
together with Autocracy and Orthodoxy, explicitly rejected the Western 
liberal idea of nationality and was instead strongly dynastic.35 Alexei Miller 
qualifies this, pointing out that Uvarov also offered support to historians 
who wrote about Russian narodnost' in liberal terms, but even though the 
ideology he promoted borrowed aspects of European thought in order to 
strengthen and bureaucratize the tsarist state, it was both pragmatic and 
32 M. K. Gandhi, "Retaliation Is No Solution," Young India, 6—7 September 1919, in The 
Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, ed. K. Swaminathan (Delhi: Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, 1965), 16:87—89, 106—9. 
33 Gorman, Imperial Citizenship, 19—20. 
34 Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen, "Coming into the Territory: Uncertainty and Empire," 
in Russian Empire, 24—25. 
35 Andrei Zorin, "Ideologiia 'pravoslaviia—samoderzhaviia—narodnosti': Opyt rekonstruktsii," 
Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, no. 26 (1997): 71—104; Nathaniel Knight, "Ethnicity, Nationality, 
and the Masses: Narodnost'and Modernity in Imperial Russia," in Russian Modernity: Politics, 
Knowledge, Practices, ed. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000), 54—55. 
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illiberal.36 Arguably, Uvarov's narodnost' helped foster a new celebration of 
Russian language, culture, and ethnicity, but it did not imply the creation 
of a political community where rights would be determined by the extent 
to which the tsar's subjects shared in these. In the cultural sphere the impact 
was admittedly profound (and in the end often productive of opposition 
to the state), and it also seems to have had some impact on foreign policy. 
Domestically, however, it did not lead to, for example, a decline in the fortunes 
of the Baltic German nobility, or the emancipation of Russian peasants from 
serfdom—at least not immediately.37 In Russia, legal and political rights and 
duties continued to be distributed according to social rank, religion, and 
occupation rather than membership of a "nation," putative or otherwise. As 
Gregory Freeze has shown, the concept of soslovie (the four estates of nobility, 
clergy, townspeople, and peasantry) which was developed in Russia from the 
late 18th century and persisted until 1917 is not a wholly satisfactory way 
of understanding even the legal regime of rights, duties, and immunities in 
the Russian Empire, let alone the real divisions of Russian society. Until the 
1870s and 1880s, the most important juridical distinction was between those 
subjects who paid the poll tax and those who did not; and beyond this, there 
were still greater variations in the rights and obligations conferred on different 
groups by the state.38 Meanwhile, in the post-1860s period, soslovie acquired a 
whole host of meanings beyond those officially ascribed to it. Madhavan Palat 
has argued that the concept was even applied by the bureaucracy to factory 
workers, meaning that in many respects until 1917 the state continued to 
treat Russian society as divided, not into legal individuals with rights but 
into groups with ascribed, estate-like identities, duties, and privileges.39 Jane 
Burbank has explored the beneficial sides of this "Imperial Rights Regime": 
though Russian liberals might despair at the lack of equality before the law 
within the empire, on a practical day-to-day level, the state often provided 
the population with local forms of justice, marriage, and administration 
which accorded with familiar customs and were easily understood.40 Russian 
peasants had their volost' courts, which provided easily accessible, personal 
36 A. I. Miller, " 'Triada' grafa S. S. Uvarova i natsionalizm," Istoricheskiezapiski, no. 11 (129) 
(2008): 180-98. 
37 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825—1855 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1961), 144-46, 162, 232-33. 
38 Gregory L. Freeze, "The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm in Russian Social History," American 
Historical Review 91, 1 (1986): 21-24. 
39 Madhavan K. Palat, "Casting Workers as an Estate in Late Imperial Russia," Kritika 8, 2 
(2007): 313-16, 342-48. 
40 Jane Burbank, "An Imperial Rights Regime: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," 
Kritika 7, 3 (2006): 397-431. 
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justice, while Central Asian peasants had their so-called "popular judges," 
qazis administering Islamic law.41 Surely under these circumstances there was 
no substantive inequality between the rights (or lack of them) enjoyed by a 
peasant who was born a Russian subject near Smolensk and one who perforce 
became a Russian subject after the fall of Tashkent? That claim was certainly 
made by some: 
Our policy toward subject peoples is that of equal civic rights [politika 
grazhdanskogo ravnopraviia]. The inhabitants of cities that have only 
just been taken, Kuldja and Tashkent, Samarkand, etc., are immediately 
considered to be as much Russian citizens as those of Moscow, for 
instance, or perhaps even have greater privileges . . . in this policy, in this 
Christian cosmopolitanism lies our strength. In this lies our future.42 
Mikhail Afrikanovich Terent'ev, a General Staff Officer and former 
administrator in Turkestan (who later wrote the standard history of the 
Russian conquest of Central Asia), also claimed that some non-Russian areas 
such as Finland and Poland enjoyed greater rights than Russia itself, and that 
the Russian peasant paid much heavier taxes than his Asiatic counterpart 
who, unlike him, was not liable to be conscripted. Was Terent'ev justified in 
making this sweeping assertion about the universal and benevolent nature of 
Russian imperial citizenship? Robert Crews notes that it was commonplace 
for Russian officials in Central Asia to invoke a higher moral purpose that 
focused on the supplanting of despotism and the "cries of the dispossessed," 
but this was a near-universal rhetorical justification for European imperialism 
across Asia and Africa, which was no more valid in the Russian case than in 
any other.43 Looking beyond the rhetoric, Terent'ev's assertion was false even 
in a strict legal sense, because the tuzemtsy (natives) of Kuldja, Samarkand, 
and Tashkent were not accorded equal rights with the population of European 
Russia. 
While in Russia the division between metropole and colony, between 
subject and citizen, was by no means as clear as in the British and French 
empires, this was largely a result of the absence of a sea barrier, which helped 
prevent the creation of entirely separate colonial states.44 In imaginative, legal 
and administrative terms the barrier did exist, if only in putative form. Even 
in the early 19th century there was a basic distinction to be made between 
41 On the qazis' courts in Turkestan, see Paolo Sartori, "An Overview of Tsarist Policy on 
Islamic Courts in Turkestan: Its Genealogy and Its Effects," in Le Turkestan russe, 477—507. 
4 2 M . A. Terent'ev, Rossiia i Angliia v Srednei Azii (St. Petersburg: P. P. Merkulev, 1875), 361. 
43 Crews, "An Empire for the Faithful," 103. 
44 Khalid, "Culture and Power," 417. 
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Russian subjects and inorodtsy ("aliens" or "those of a different birth"),4 5 a 
term that had taken over from inovertsy ("differently believing") in the late 
18th century, although it did not acquire pejorative connotations until much 
later.46 Rather than representing differences in political rights, the concept of 
inorodtsy reflected differences in the duties of these groups toward the state: 
often the payment of tribute (iasak) rather than tax and exemption from 
military service (except in the case of the Jews). This legal category, however, 
could hardly be used to define Russians and non-Russians, or Orthodox and 
non-Orthodox, even once it had been codified by Mikhail Speranskii.47 Not 
only were some Muslim groups such as the Tatars not defined as inorodtsy, but 
Andrei Znamenski has identified a group of ethnically Russian Old Believers 
called the "rock people" in the Altai, who were declared to be iasak payers 
by the state in 1791 and managed to retain the status of inorodtsy for almost 
90 years, only reluctantly relinquishing it in 1878.48 This suggests both the 
extent to which being an inorodets could actually bring certain benefits, and 
that by the later 19th century ideas of citizenship were beginning to change. 
As Yanni Kotsonis has suggested, 19th-century Russia participated in a 
shared European framework of modernity, with Western states and societies 
frequently invoked as a model. The state pursued many of the same integrative 
strategies, but these took somewhat different forms.49 The middle years of the 
19th century saw the emergence of a new Russian governmental language 
of grazhdanstvennost', variously translated as "citizenship," "civic values," 
or "civic consciousness" and defined by Vladimir Dal' as the "condition 
45 See John W. Slocum, "Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category 
of Aliens in Imperial Russia," Russian Review 57, 2 (1998): 173-90, for a discussion of the 
changing meanings of this term as it evolved as a legal category. The most consistent meaning 
was that of subjects of the tsar who were nomads and hunter-gatherers, or otherwise considered 
to be uncivilized, but the Jews and the settled population of Turkestan represent the most 
important exceptions to this rule. In popular usage by the late 19th century the term often had 
explicitly religious and pejorative overtones. 
46 Kappeler, The Russian Empire, 169; Paul Werth, "Changing Conceptions of Difference, 
Assimilation, and Faith in the Volga-Kama Region, 1740-1870," in Russian Empire, 174. 
47 "Ustav ob upravlenii inorodtsev," Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii s 1649: Sobranie 
pervoe s 1649po 12 dekabria 1825goda, 45 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II-ogo Otdeleniia 
Sobstvennoi Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830) (hereafter PSZ), no. 29126, 
22 July 1822, 394-417; Marc Raeff, Siberia and the Reforms of 1822 (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1956), 112-28. 
48 Andrei Znamenski, "The 'Ethic of Empire' on the Siberian Borderland: The Peculiar Case 
of the 'Rock People,' 1791-1878," in Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization 
in Eurasian History, ed. Nicholas Breyfogle, Abby Schrader, and Willard Sunderland (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 106-27. 
49 Yanni Kotsonis, "Introduction: A Modern Paradox—Subject and Citizen in Nineteenth-
and Twentieth-Century Russia," in Russian Modernity, ed Hoffmann and Kotsonis, 3. 
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[sostoianie] of civil society; the understanding and level of education essential 
for the making of civil society."50 Unlike the Western ideal of citizenship, 
grazhdanstvennost' did not depend upon the exercise of the vote. Nevertheless, 
the tenor of the concept aimed ultimately at integration, abolishing estate-
based taxation, eliminating local variations in governance, and curtailing 
the privileges granted to local, non-Russian elites.51 In practice, however, it 
was often used as an exclusionary category and applied negatively to peoples 
considered to be at a low level of cultural development.52 The language and 
logic of grazhdanstvennost' are seen to particularly good effect in an 1867 ukaz 
sponsored by Minister of War D. A. Miliutin, which forbade the awarding 
of medals and other military distinctions to the leaders of Kazakh, Kalmyk, 
Bashkir, and other inorodtsy tribes and to the "natives" of the Caucasus.53 
It has been brought to the attention of His Majesty the Emperor that the 
granting of military ranks and other exclusively military decorations and 
distinctions to Asiatics, who are still at a low level of civic consciousness 
[Aziiatsam, nakhodiashchimsiaeshchenanizkoistepenigrazhdanstvennosti], 
facilitates the maintenance among that population of warlike tendencies, 
when a healthy policy demands, on the contrary, that the government 
should with all its strength re-educate these peoples to a peaceful life and 
lead them to civic development [ k razvitiiu grazhdanskomu].54 
Although this was outwardly an inclusive vision, which looked forward 
to the day when these (mainly nomadic) peoples would abandon their warlike 
5 0 V. I . Dal', Tolkovyi slovar' zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka (St. Petersburg: M . O. Vol'f, 1880), 
1:390. 
51 Dov Yaroshevski, "Empire and Citizenship," Austin Lee Jersild, "From Savagery to 
Citizenship," and Daniel Brower, "Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan," 
all in Russia's Orient: Imperial Borderlands and People, 1800—1917, ed. Brower and Edward 
J. Lazzerini (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 69-70, 101-11, and 115-22, 
respectively; Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain Peoples and the 
Georgian Frontier, 1845—1917 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2002), 126-28; 
Yanni Kotsonis, " 'No Place to Go': Taxation and State Transformation in Late Imperial and 
Early Soviet Russia," Journal of Modern History 76, 3 (2004): 537-38. 
52 Tomohiko Uyama, "A Particularist Empire: The Russian Policies of Christianization and 
Military Conscription in Central Asia," in Empire, Islam, and Politics, 62. 
53 The importance of this decree was highlighted by Dov Yaroshevski in "Empire and 
Citizenship," 69-70. My thanks to Professor Yaroshevski for sending me the full reference. 
54 "O zapreshchenii isprashivat' voinskie nagrady i v osobennosti voennye chiny Bashkiram, 
Kirgizam, Kalmykam i drugim inorodcheskim plemenam," Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi 
imperii: Sobranie vtoroe, 55 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia II-ogo Otdeleniia Sobstvennoi 
Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva Kantseliarii, 1830-84) (hereafter PSZ 2), no. 44424a, 2 April 
1867, 3; my thanks to Professor Tomohiko Uyama for pointing out to me that in practice this 
decree was widely ignored and that, for instance, many Kazakh leaders were decorated for their 
role in the conquest of Turkestan after 1867. 
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tendencies and be fully incorporated into imperial civic society, it carried with 
it clear developmental overtones. The necessary implication was that, so long 
as these groups remained backward, with a low level of grazhdanstvennost' , 
they would remain excluded from the fledgling political community that 
was being created in European Russia. The British and French examples 
show clearly enough how an ostensible commitment to admit sufficiently 
"developed" natives to the status of citizens could be rendered void by making 
the process impossibly arduous or protracted. In the Russian case, this was 
further complicated by the fact that in the 19th century, the empire's frontiers 
expanded at an unprecedented rate, incorporating new populations, which 
were seen as even further away from achieving grazhdanstvennost' than the 
groups mentioned here. Political changes at the center made that goal seem 
ever more remote. 
One widely overlooked aspect of the Great Reforms was that they helped 
define what could be described as a core, metropolitan area within the Russian 
Empire, a growing if inconsistent distinction between the ways in which Russians 
and non-Russians were governed. The zemstvos, which were created by the 
ukaz of 1 January 1864, were not immediately introduced in the borderlands 
of the Russian Empire: right-bank Ukraine, Orenburg, Ufa, Astrakhan, Poland, 
the Baltic provinces, Archangel'sk, Siberia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia 
were all excluded from the initial reform, and the latter six would remain so 
until 1917.55 As Jorg Baberowski and Larissa Zakharova have shown, these 
areas were also excluded from what was perhaps the most radical of the Great 
Reforms, the judiciary reform. The new public, adversarial civilian courts, with 
their elected magistrates and peasant juries, were restricted to the central regions 
of European Russia; and even here, Jews and Muslims were heavily under-
represented on juries. The reformers' goal of a single legal system for the whole 
empire remained distant, not merely because of the retention of peasants' courts 
in European Russia but because of the exclusion of the "periphery" (which in 
fact comprised the bulk of the empire's territory) from their remit. While the 
reforms were not extended in the western borderlands and the Baltic provinces 
because of fears of local nationalism, in Turkestan and the steppe the rationale 
advanced for retaining local law and withholding the new civil code and jury 
trial was the "savagery" and "backwardness" of these regions.56 This division 
55 Fedor A. Petrov, "Crowning the Edifice," in Russia's Great Reforms, 1855—1881, ed. Ben 
Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 
200; L. E. Lapteva, Regional'noe i mestnoe upravlenie v Rossii (vtoraia polovina XIX veka) 
(Moscow: Institut gosudarstvo i prava Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 1998), 73. 
56 Jorg Baberowski, Autokratie und Justiz: Zum Verhdltnis von Rechtsstaatlichkeit und 
Ruckstdndigkeit im ausgehenden Zarenreich 1864—1914 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
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both reflected and helped reinforce the division between a "core" area of "Great 
Russia," and an "empire" that lay beyond it, something which is not always 
sufficiently recognized in the literature on the subject.57 In his historical survey 
of viceroys, voevody, and governors, published in anticipation of the zemstvo 
reform, and which he felt would transform their role fundamentally, the jurist 
Ivan Andreevskii used revealing language when he wrote, "On this basis I have 
looked at these posts only with relation to Great Russia [Velikorossiia]; the 
examination of the corresponding posts in those provinces that now make up 
a part of the Russian Empire [v tekh oblastiakh, kotorye sostavliaiut teper' chasti 
Rossiiskoi imperii] but which have their own separate life and history, would 
require a dedicated work."58 
The 1860s were a turning point in the history of Russian governance, not 
just because of the Great Reforms but because they also saw the Polish revolt 
(1863), victory in the Caucasus (1864), and the fall ofTashkent (1865).59 All 
ofthese presented the tsarist state with new challenges in ruling its borderlands, 
to which new strategies of control were applied. Prince Aleksandr Ivanovich 
Bariatinskii, the architect of Russia's victory in the Caucasus, believed that 
the Russians had made a grave error in adhering to their traditional policy 
of trying to win over and support the local nobility and tribal leaders in the 
region. Instead, he felt that it was precisely these groups that had been stoking 
"fanaticism" among the local population.60 Accordingly, from the 1850s 
on, both North and South Caucasian elites began to lose their privileges 
and their role in government.61 As Peter Holquist has shown, later Soviet 
Klostermann, 1996), 365—427; Larissa G. Zakharova, "Autocracy and the Reforms of 1861— 
74 in Russia," and Alexander Afanas'ev, "Jurors and Jury Trials in Imperial Russia," in Russia's 
Great Reforms, 33, 222. 
57 The texts of the zemstvo and judicial reform legislation are reprinted in O. I. Chistiakov 
and T. E. Novitskaia eds., Reformy Alexandra II (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1998), 
211—30, 277—336, but without the preamble indicating in which provinces they were to be 
applied. The editors mention the exclusion of the western provinces for fear of nationalism 
but not the systematic exclusion of most of the nomadic and Muslim regions of the empire 
(21). Peter Waldron, in Governing Tsarist Russia (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 
107, writes that by the time World War I broke out, zemstvos were operating in territories 
containing 60% of the empire's population, but he does not devote any consideration to how 
the remaining 40% were governed. 
5 8 Ivan Andreevskii, O namestnikakh, voevodakh igubernatorakh (St. Petersburg: Eduard Prats, 
1864), 2. 
59 Burbank and von Hagen, "Coming into the Territory," 18. 
60 Alexander Marshall, The Russian GeneralStaffand Asia (London: Routledge, 2006), 40—41. 
61 Jersild, Orientalism and Empire, 32—33; Firouzeh Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier: 
Tsarist Russia and Islam in the Caucasus (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 21, 27, 83—84; M. M. 
Gasanov, Administrativnaiapolitika i sistema upravleniia tsarizma v Dagestane vo vtoroipolovine 
XIX veka (Makhachkala: Lotos, 2007), 31—33. 
METROPOLE, COLONY, A N D IMPERIAL CITIZENSHIP 343 
ideas of "extracting" troublesome elements from the population can also be 
traced back to imperial policies in the Caucasus in this period.62 Elsewhere 
the process had begun even earlier: since the 1820s, Russian policy in the 
steppe had gradually undermined the authority of the Chingissid ruling elite 
among the Kazakhs, something that was institutionalized by the new Steppe 
Statute of 1868.63 This did not mean that the empire ceased to rely on the 
cooperation and collaboration of elements of the non-Russian population 
over which it ruled, but it did mean that local aristocracies would no longer 
be incorporated into the Russian nobility on equal terms, as had happened 
to the Baltic German and Georgian nobility and, to some extent, the Poles.64 
While in 1897 the various Central Asian peoples made up 5.8 percent of 
the empire's population, only 0.15 percent of hereditary nobles came from 
this group: these were predominantly Kazakhs from the steppe region, most 
of them from the lineages of the sultans of the Inner, Middle and Bukei 
Hordes, whose families had acquired their privileges when they became 
Russian subjects in the 18th century. Nevertheless, there were almost five 
times as many Russian, Polish, and German nobles as Kazakhs even here, 
despite the fact that Kazakhs made up 77 percent of the population. In 
Turkestan, the contrast was still starker: Russian-speakers made up 3 percent 
of the population but 79 percent of its hereditary nobles. The remainder were 
mostly German or Polish: just 119 Kazakhs (0.01 percent of the total Kazakh 
population of Turkestan), 2 Kyrgyz, 1 "Sart," 3 Uzbeks, and 5 Tajiks were 
hereditary nobles. Another 53 speakers of all these languages had personal 
noble status.65 In Samarkand province, where Europeans made up less than 
2 percent of the population in 1897, only 10 out of 507 hereditary nobles 
were drawn from the "native" population.66 Rather than reinforce existing 
social hierarchies through the granting of noble privileges, a new imperial 
62 Peter Holquist, "To Count, to Extract, and to Exterminate: Population Statistics and 
Population Politics in Late Imperial Russia," in A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making 
in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Suny and Terry Martin (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 116-7. 
63 Tomohiko Uyama, "A Strategic Alliance between Kazakh Intellectuals and Russian 
Administrators: Imagined Communities in Dala Walayatining Gazeti (1888-1902)," in The 
Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia, ed. Tadayuki Hayashi 
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2003), 247. 
6 4 Lieven, Empire, 274-75. 
6 5 Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler, and Brigitte Roth, eds., Die Nationalitdten des russischen 
Reiches in der Volkszdhlung von 1897 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991), vol. B, tables 30 and 46, 
197, 366-67. 
6 6 N . A. Troinitskii, ed., Pervaia vseobshchaiaperepis ' naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii, 1897g., 83: 
Samarkandskaia oblast' (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Tsentral'nogo statisticheskogo komiteta 
Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, 1905), 132. 
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policy was formulated that attempted to separate the mass of inorodtsy from 
their traditional allegiances and replace these with local institutions of self-
government, which were supposed gradually to inculcate grazhdanstvennost'. 
Bashkiria offers a particularly interesting example of this new imperial 
policy. This Muslim-majority borderland region was gradually demilitarized 
and incorporated into the "core" empire by a process oflegal and administrative 
reform. As Charles Steinwedel has argued, it was the transition from frontier 
military administration to "internal" civilian province that eventually made 
Bashkiria a part of "European" Russia, rather than any particularly aggressive 
policies of cultural assimilation.67 In religious terms, the transition dated from 
the founding of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly under Catherine 
the Great, which many Muslims seem to have been using as a forum for 
the redress of grievances by the 1830s and 1840s.68 In administrative terms, 
reform came later, with the gradual transfer from military to civilian rule 
in the 1860s. The Statute on the Bashkirs (Polozhenie o Bashkirakh) of 
1863 stated that "Bashkirs and other inorodtsy, forming together the current 
Bashkir military, [are given] equal civil [grazhdanskie] rights with other free 
agrarian communities and [are] to create their social administration under 
the general basic arrangements laid out by Us for the organization of agrarian 
communities."69 Two years later, this integrative measure was reinforced with 
the transfer of the administration of the Bashkirs of the Orenburg and Samara 
governor-generalship from military to civilian rule.70 In 1875, Ufa became a 
zemstvo province—which, as Steinwedel suggests, reflects the judgment of the 
authorities that there were sufficient numbers of educated noblemen in the 
province to make devolved representative government work.7 1 In 1878, the 
new civilian law code was introduced; and the administrative "internalization" 
of what had been a frontier region was completed with the abolition of the 
Orenburg governor-generalship in 1881 and the extension of the zemstvo to 
Orenburg province in 1913. The cumulative effect of the Great Reforms as 
they were progressively extended to the region was to undermine the position 
of Bashkir landowners in the countryside, but to give them and other social 
groups in Ufa and Orenburg provinces the opportunity for new forms of 
67 Charles Steinwedel, "How Bashkiria Became Part of European Russia, 1762—1881," in 
Russian Empire, 94—96. 
68 Robert D. Crews, "Empire and the Confessional State: Islam and Religious Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Russia," American Historical Review 108, 1 (2003): 50—83. 
69 "Polozhenie o Bashkirakh," PSZ 2, no. 39622, 14 May 1863, 442. 
70 "O peredache upravleniia Bashkirami iz voennogo v grazhdanskoe vedomstvo," PSZ 2, no. 
42282, 2 July 1865, 753—76. 
71 Steinwedel, "How Bashkiria Became Part of European Russia," 106. 
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civic participation through the zemstvo.72 After all these measures had been 
introduced, however, the Bashkirs were still not placed on an entirely equal 
footing even with their Tatar Muslim neighbors in Kazan province. The Statute 
on the Bashkirs was used by tsarist officials to facilitate the expropriation of 
Bashkir land and to prevent the creation of waqf endowments. It also meant 
that the Stolypin land reforms were never fully introduced in the region.73 
Furthermore, Bashkiria represented the furthest eastward march of these 
new Russian civic institutions. While, as Paul Werth has argued, it is often 
impossible to say whether non-Russians belonged in the category of national 
minority or colonial subject in the more liminal areas of the empire such 
as Bashkiria or the Volga-Kama region, in other parts of the empire the 
distinction was much clearer.74 
As important as understanding the implications for those minorities who were 
included in the new vision of Russian imperial citizenship, is understanding 
the reasons why other regions and peoples were excluded from them, 
together with the process that helped create this division, the policies that 
were pursued instead, and the concrete effects these policies had on those 
who were subject to them. The territorial divisions of the Russian Empire 
saw wide variations in their legal and administrative structures. Newly 
conquered, non-Russian regions were normally governed "at arm's length" 
through viceroys or governors-general, with only a simple (and often skeletal) 
military administration at their disposal.75 As Leonid Gorizontov has shown, 
in the western borderlands, even before the Great Reform period, Russian 
official thinking made a clear distinction between "regular" provinces, 
whose territory and governance could be determined by straightforward 
considerations of administrative convenience and economic advantage, and 
"difficult," strategically vulnerable provinces, often with acute "nationality" 
72 Charles Steinwedel, "Invisible Threads of Empire: State, Religion, and Ethnicity in Tsarist 
Bashkiria, 1773-1917" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1999), 91-95. 
73 I am grateful to Norihiro Naganawa for this information, which highlights the substantial 
variations in administrative and legal regimes which existed even within particular regions such 
as the Volga-Urals. 
74 Werth, "Changing Conceptions of Difference," 178. 
75 A. V. Remnev and P. I. Savel'ev, "Aktual'nye problemy izucheniia regional'nykh protsessov 
v Imperskoi Rossii," in Imperskii stroi Rossii v regional 'nom izmerenii (XlX—nachalo XX veka), 
ed. P. I. Savel'ev (Moscow: Moskovskii obshchestvennyi nauchnyi fond, 1997), 16-17. 
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issues.76 Kimitaka Matsuzato has stressed the strategic imperative that 
dictated that sensitive border regions remain under military rule where 
there were either external or internal "enemies."77 As Tomohiko Uyama has 
suggested, Matsuzato's thesis requires some qualification: though legal and 
administrative regimes were divided on a regional basis, different laws could 
apply to different peoples within a particular territory.78 This was because 
the application of laws also depended on the perceived degree of civilization 
of a region's inhabitants, something that was often inextricable from their 
ethnicity or race. As Marina Mogil'ner has shown, the categorization of the 
empire's subjects according to "race" by physical anthropologists was widely 
diffused but inconsistently applied. If Ivan Alekseevich Sikorskii and the Kiev 
school had a vision of a Russian racial "core" surrounded by inferior races, 
the "liberal anthropology" that emerged in Moscow eschewed hierarchies 
and rigid divisions and instead explored kinship among different "physical 
types" across the empire.79 While the Russian state made relatively little use 
of overt biological racism as a justification for different administrative and 
legal regimes (with the notable exception of late imperial antisemitism),80 
the developmental logic of grazhdanstvennost' meant that many peoples were 
excluded from its new civic institutions as too backward, untrustworthy, 
savage, or "fanatical," or simply because they had been conquered too 
recently.81 
76 Leonid Gorizontov, "In Search of Internal Balance: Debate on Changes in the Territorial-
Administrative Division of the Russian Empire in the 1830s and 1840s," in Imperiology, 
197—98. 
77 Kimitaka Matsuzato, "General-gubernatorstva v Rossiiskoi imperii," in Novaia imperskaia 
istoriia postsovetskogo prostranstva, ed. Il'ia Gerasimov, Sergei Glebov, A. P. Kaplunovskii, 
Marina Mogil'ner, and Aleksandr Semenov (Kazan: Tsentr issledovanii natsionalizma i imperii, 
2004), 447—48. 
78 Uyama, "A Particularist Empire," 23—24. 
79 Marina Mogilner, "Russian Physical Anthropology of the Nineteenth—Early Twentieth 
Centuries: Imperial Race, Colonial Other, Degenerate Types, and the Russian Racial Body," 
in Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, 
ed. Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 155—89; 
Mogil'ner, Homo imperii: Istoriiafizicheskoi antropologii v Rossii (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe 
obozrenie, 2008), 15—19, 187—278. 
80 See Eugene M. Avrutin, "Racial Categories and the Politics of (Jewish) Difference in Late 
Imperial Russia," Kritika 8, 1 (2007): 13—40, where he notes that, as in Western Europe, 
the impact of popular understandings of race was considerably greater than that of any state 
activity. 
81 In referring to the "backwardness" and "primitiveness" of "the lowest echelon of mostly 
Asiatic nationalities" Raymond Pearson unconsciously echoed the language used by tsarist 
officials at the time ("Privileges, Rights, and Russification," in Civil Rights in Imperial Russia, 
ed. Olga Crisp and Linda Edmondson [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989], 101). 
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Until the late 19th century, and in some important cases until 1917, 
much of the empire's Asian territory was ruled under a system of military 
government called voenno-narodnoe upravlenie, which, as Vladimir 
Bobrovnikov has suggested, had numerous parallels with the devolved, 
militarized administration used in many French and British colonies.82 
Russian governance has attracted increasing scholarly attention,83 yet most 
of the literature in English does not mention the role played by the military, 
while most military history does not mention the army's role in government.84 
The most important characteristic of voenno-narodnoe upravlenie was a clear 
division between a higher bureaucracy, where executive power was reserved 
for military officers on permanent secondment from their regiments, and a 
lower or "native" administration and judiciary, parts of which were sometimes 
elected indirectly. In some regions, the voenno-narodnoe upravlenie co-existed 
with a civil judiciary that applied the general laws of the empire, but in others 
the law, too, was in the hands of the military. Most of the duties that in 
European Russia were carried out by the zemstvos and cadres associated with 
them fell to the lot of a small group of officers. Usually lacking specialist 
training, they were presented with an extremely heavy administrative 
burden.85 In many cases they were not equal to the task, and voenno-narodnoe 
upravlenie had a tendency to be both ramshackle and arbitrary. This was true 
in the Far East, where Remnev writes of an "administrative vacuum" below the 
level of governor, and in the North Caucasus. In Turkestan, a single district 
commandant carried out duties that would have been the responsibility of 12 
or more different officials in European Russia.86 
8 2 V. O. Bobrovnikov, Musul'mane severnogo Kavkaza: Pravo, obychai, nasilie (Moscow: 
Vostochnaia literatura, 2002), 171-75. 
83 Apart from Bobrovnikov and Remnev, see also S. G. Agadzhanov, "Osnovnye cherty 
sistemy upravleniia natsional'nykh okrain Rossii," in Natsional'nye okrainy Rossiiskoi imperii: 
Stanovlenie i razvitie sistemy upravleniia, ed. Agadzhanov (Moscow: Slavianskii dialog, 1997), 
394-96; M. L. Kudel'ia-Odabashian, Voenno-narodnoe upravlenie v koloniiakh Rossiiskoi 
imperii, XIX v.—nachalo XX veka (Moscow: Rossiiskaia ekonomicheskaia akademiia im. G. V. 
Plekhanova, 2003). 
84 This is seen to good effect in vol. 2 of the Cambridge History of Russia, where Janet Hartley, 
in "Provincial and Local Government" (450), specifies that she will consider only European 
Russia, while William C. Fuller, in "The Imperial Army" (530-53), does not mention its role 
in administration. 
85 Don K. Rowney, "The Institutional Structure of Late Tsarist Officialdom: An Introduction," 
in Russian Bureaucracy and the State, ed. Rowney and Eugene Huskey (Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 24-25. 
86 A. V. Remnev, "Administrativnaia politika samoderzhaviia v Sibiri v 60-80-kh gg. XIX 
v.," in Sibir' v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii, ed. L. M . Dameshek and Remnev (Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007), 125-30; Timothy Blauvelt, "Military-Civil Administration and 
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Like most of the empire's administrative and cultural boundaries, those 
between "zemskaia Rossiia" and areas under military government shifted 
over time.8 7 The European governor-generalships of the empire were mostly 
liquidated in the 1850s and 1860s.88 Most of the European provinces were 
eventually granted a modified form of zemstvo, but in areas where it was 
likely to prove impossible to engineer an electoral preponderance for the 
Great Russian nobility, they remained restricted.89 The three Baltic provinces 
and Grodno, Vilno, and Kovno were excluded; and continued distrust of the 
largely Polish nobility of the region meant considerable uncertainty about 
the wisdom of doing this in right-bank Ukraine and White Russia, which 
eventually received only so-called "margarine zemstvos" with reduced powers 
in 1911.9 0 In 1912—13 the zemstvo law was extended to the Asiatic fringes 
of European Russia, in Orenburg, Stavropol', and Astrakhan provinces, 
although nomadic peoples such as the Kazakhs and Kalmyks were specifically 
excluded from the legislation.91 The Caucasian viceroyalty was abolished in 
1881, with most territories of Transcaucasia becoming civilian gubernii on 
all-Russian lines (albeit without zemstvos). Meanwhile, the North Caucasus 
and Kars oblast remained under a form of voenno-narodnoe upravlenie that 
concentrated executive powers in the hands of military commandants and 
restricted the use of both Shari'a and the general laws of the empire in favor of 
local custom, or 'adat.92 When in 1905 the Caucasian viceroyalty was revived 
with plenipotentiary powers, the new namestnik, Prince Vorontsov-Dashkov, 
Islam in the North Caucasus, 1858—83," Kritika 11, 2 (2010): 228—32; Senator Gofmeister 
Graf K. K. Palen, Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraia, proizvedennoipo VYSOCHAISHEMU 
poveleniiu... (St. Petersburg: Senatskaia tipografiia, 1910), 12: Uezdnoe upravlenie, 156. 
87 Nikolai Karyshev, Zemskiia khodataistva 1865-1884 gg. (Moscow: A. A. Lang, 1900), 7; 
Burbank and von Hagen, "Coming into the Territory," 22. 
88 A. V. Remnev, "General-gubernatorskaia vlast' v XIX stoletii: K probleme organizatsii 
regional'nogo upravleniia Rossiiskoi imperii," in Imperskii stroi Rossii, 56. 
8 9 Kermit E. McKenzie, "The Zemstvo and Administration," in The Zemstvo in Russia: An 
Experiment in Local Self-Government, ed. Terence Emmons and Wayne S. Vucinich (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 34—35. 
90 Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on 
the Western Frontier, 1863—1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996), 133—51; 
Kimitaka Matsuzato, "The Issue of Zemstvos in Right-Bank Ukraine, 1864—1905: Russian 
Anti-Polonism under the Challenges of Modernization," Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 
51, 2 (2003): 218—35. 
9 1 L. E. Lapteva, Zemskie uchrezhdeniia v Rossii (Moscow: Institut gosudarstva i prava 
Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 1993), 122. 
92 Zh. A. Kalmykov, Ustanovlenie russkoi administratsii v Kabarde i Balkarii (Nal'chik:, 
El'brus, 1995), 20—29; Bobrovnikov, Musul'mane severnogo Kavkaza, 147—66; Michael 
Kemper, " 'Adat against Shari'a: Russian Approaches towards Daghestani 'Customary Law' in 
the 19th Century," Ab Imperio, no. 3 (2005): 147—74. 
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set about trying to eliminate military rule, beginning with judicial reforms. 
The Duma also debated the possibility of introducing zemstvos to the civilian 
gubernii of the region, but neither had been achieved before World War I 
broke out.9 3 The West Siberian governor-generalship was abolished in 1882, 
and Tomsk and Tobol'sk provinces were placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of the Interior, although the powers exercised by their governors 
remained more or less unchanged.94 Although in 1907 the Duma debated 
a project for the introduction of the zemstvo to Tobol'sk province, it was 
not passed into law, and zemstvos were extended to Siberia only by the 
Provisional Government in 1917.95 The East Siberian governor-generalship 
was subdivided into oblasts after 1884 but remained under military authority, 
something reinforced by the establishment of a Far Eastern viceroyalty as 
Russia moved into Manchuria and Port Arthur.9 6 The situation in the steppe 
was particularly complicated, with considerable fragmentation of authority: 
after 1881, with the abolition of the Orenburg and West Siberian governor-
generalships, the Stepnoi krai was created, comprising the Ural'sk, Turgai, 
Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, and (until 1898-99) Semirech'e oblasts, with 
military governors under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. 
The latter three provinces constituted the governor-generalship of the 
Stepnoi krai, but all five were regulated under the revised Steppe Statute 
(Stepnoe Polozhenie) of 1891, which opened the way to increased Russian 
colonization by establishing the state's right to expropriate "surplus" nomadic 
land.97 In 1898, civilian courts and an independent judiciary were extended 
to the steppe, although their jurisdiction was limited almost exclusively to 
Russian settlers and Kazakhs retained their 'adat courts.98 There was also 
93 L. S. Gatagova and D. I. Ismail-zade, "Kavkaz," in Natsional'nye okrainy, ed. Agadzhanov, 
286-90, 309-15. 
94 A. V. Remnev, Upravlenie Sibir iu i Dal'nim Vostokom v XIX—nachale XX vv. (Omsk: 
Izdatel'stvo Omskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1991), 66-67. 
95 M. V. Ugriumova, "Zemskii vopros i zemskoe samoupravlenie v Tobol'skoi gubernii (vtoraia 
polovina XIX v.—1919 g." (abstract for Candidate of Historical Sciences diss., Tiumenskii 
gosudarstvennyi universitet, 2002), 27-28. 
96 A. A. Toropov, "Administrativno-territorial'noe delenie Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka," 
in Dal'nii Vostok Rossii: Iz istorii sistemy upravleniia. Dokumenty i materialy (Vladivostok: 
Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Dal'nego vostoka, 1999), 18-20. 
97 "Polozhenie ob upravlenii oblastei Akmolinskoi, Semipalatinskoi, Semirechenskoi, Ural'skoi i 
Turgaiskoi i ob izmenenii nekotorykh statei Polozhenii ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo kraia," Polnoe 
sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii: Sobranie tret 'e, 33 vols. (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia 
tipografiia, 1895-1916) (hereafter PSZ 3), no. 7574, 25 March 1891, 133^7. 
9 8 Virginia Martin, Law and Custom in the Steppe: The Kazakhs of the Middle Horde and 
Russian Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century (Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2001), 56-57; N. E. 
Bekmakhanova, "Kazakhstan i Sredniaia Aziia," in Natsional'nye okrainy, 335-43. 
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some official debate about the possible extension of zemstvos to the region, 
although with measures to ensure that Kazakhs could not form a majority on 
the zemstvo boards; this remained unrealized in 1917.99 Turkestan remained 
under military rule until the fall of tsarism, and the proposed introduction 
of zemstvos to the region by the Provisional Government never went into 
effect. Altogether, the leading tsarist historian of the zemstvo concluded, 43 
provinces with a population of 110 million had zemstvos in 1917, while 51 
provinces with a population of 61 million still lacked them. 1 0 0 
This division between military and civilian government and between 
zemstvo and non-zemstvo provinces clearly did not imply the same degree 
of disparity of rights between metropole and colony which existed in Britain 
after the Reform Act of 1867 and in France after the establishment of the 
Third Republic. There was, nevertheless, a disparity, one that has often been 
overlooked by historians. In an otherwise convincing paper on the remarkable 
economic diversity that existed even within European Russia, David Saunders 
does not mention this important distinction in political rights between the 
50-odd "core provinces" of the empire that he identifies and the borderlands 
under military rule.101 Jane Burbank describes how the imperial state assigned 
varying sets of rights to particular peoples, but the passage of local elites into 
the higher state bureaucracy which she mentions as characteristic of Russian 
statecraft was impossible in areas under military rule, as voenno-narodnoe 
upravlenie was predicated on a clear distinction between the higher (European) 
administration and lower-level native officials. In most cases, the "distinctive 
treatment of inorodtsy through separate legal codes and regulations" was thus 
not, as she argues, "entirely in accord with the way ethnic Russians were 
governed."102 Similarly, Robert Crews's attempt to provide a general survey 
of the Muslim relationship with the Russian state in the 19th century is 
undermined by his failure to appreciate the very different administrative and 
legal structures that existed in the Volga-Ural region and in Central Asia: the 
Muslims of Kazan province were full subjects of the Russian state, liable for 
conscription but also with access to jury trial, the zemstvo, and the Orenburg 
Spiritual Assembly.103 Even the neighbouring Bashkirs suffered certain legal 
99 My thanks to Professor Tomohiko Uyama for alerting me to these points. 
1 0 0 V. Veselovskii, Zemstvo i zemskaia reforma (Petrograd: O. N. Popova, 1917), 16. 
1 0 1 David Saunders, "Regional Diversity in the Later Russian Empire," Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, 10 (2000): 143-63. 
1 0 2 Jane Burbank, "The Rights of Difference: Law and Citizenship in the Russian Empire," in 
Imperial Formations, ed. Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue (Santa Fe, 
N M : School for Advanced Research, 2007), 81, 93-94. 
1 0 3 Crews, For Prophet and Tsar, chap. 5. 
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disabilities by comparison, although they had a landowning nobility which, 
until the late 19th century at least, retained a number of important rights 
and privileges.104 None of this applied to the Kazakhs or to the inhabitants of 
Tashkent. A good example of the practical difference is offered by Norihiro 
Naganawa, who describes how, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
there was an extensive debate among the Muslims of the Volga—Ural region 
as to whether the existing network of traditional and "new-method" maktabs 
should come under zemstvo control and form part of the national movement 
toward universal primary education. As he points out, however, no such 
debate was possible in Turkestan, since there were no zemstvos and the 
entire system of Muslim primary and secondary education remained almost 
entirely beyond state control.1 0 5 Such differences suggest that we should be 
very careful in putting forward the idea of a common "Muslim" experience 
of Russian imperial rule. Any attempt to create a broad overview of the 
empire's administrative policies, practices, and debates must incorporate the 
experience of the regions under military rule, in particular Central Asia. 
The example of Turkestan, the largest and most populous region to remain 
continuously under military government until 1917, helps illuminate the 
official reasoning behind this division, together with some of its practical 
effects. Isolated geographically from European Russia by an expanse of steppe 
that took two months to cross by caravan, Turkestan was isolated still more 
decisively in the minds of tsarist officials by its dense, ancient, and settled 
Islamic culture. The difference was expressed in a vocabulary that persistently 
described the local population as tuzemtsy (natives) or even aborigines, 
emphasizing the degree to which the Russians were incomers to the region.106 
It was also clearly laid out in urban planning, which followed the pattern 
of the cantonments of British India or the Villes nouvelles of French North 
Africa. By providing separate "Russian quarters" alongside older Central 
Asian towns, these "separate species" could live separately, as the famous travel 
writer Evgenii Markov put i t . 1 0 7 Vladimir Bobrovnikov has noted that the 
1 0 4 Steinwedel, "Invisible Threads of Empire," 91—95. 
1 0 5 Norihiro Naganawa, "Maktab or School? Introduction of Universal Primary Education 
among the Volga—Ural Muslims," in Empire, Islam, and Politics, 65—97. 
1 0 6 Khalid, "Culture and Power," 419—20. See, for instance, N. A. Maev, Turkestanskaia 
vystavka 1890g.: Putevoditel' po vystavke i ee otdelam (Tashkent: n.p., 1890), 4. 
1 0 7 E. Markov, Rossiia v SredneiAzii: Ocherki puteshestviiapo Zakavkaz'iu, Turkmenii, Bukhare, 
Samarkandskoi, Tashkentskoi i Ferganskoi oblastiam, Kaspiiskomu moriu i Volge (St. Petersburg: 
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system of voenno-narodnoe upravlenie developed for Turkestan was modeled in 
part on the one developed over the previous 20 years in the Caucasus, where 
many of the first generation of Turkestani officers had served.108 Memories of 
the Caucasus War also helped ensure that the chief marker of the population's 
difference would be religion, and there was a widespread assumption among 
most of Turkestan's officers that most Muslims were "fanatics." Accordingly, 
the first governor-general, Konstantin Petrovich von Kaufman, adopted an 
official policy of "ignoring" Islam, which led to the exclusion of the region 
from the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly.109 In 
practice, the authorities were forced to preserve and work with many religious 
institutions such as the qazis courts and religious endowments, but this was 
an unwilling product both of a lack of resources and a deep-seated fear that 
excessive interference in religious institutions and practices could provoke 
revolt, not a continuation of earlier tsarist policy, which saw the co-optation 
of Islam by the state as a positive good. 
Even when elements of Turkestan's administration were ostensibly 
modeled on practice in European Russia, the consequences were very different. 
For the peasants of European Russia, the sel'skoe obshchestvo became the basic 
tax-paying and administrative unit under the 1861 reforms and may have 
constituted a formalization of the existing peasant commune. In Turkestan, 
by contrast, it was an entirely artificial construct, lumping together groups of 
villages that had never before formed administrative units and creating new 
local oligarchies.110 Grazhdanstvennost' was frequently invoked by the officers 
responsible for Russian administrative policy in the settled regions of Central 
Asia, and inculcating this elusive quality remained a permanent but ever-
receding goal for the Russian administration.111 By the 1880s, there were calls 
for greater administrative sblizhenie through the introduction of elements of 
civilian rule. The clearest statement both of the role the Russians felt should 
be played by voenno-narodnoe upravlenie, and their planned timetable for 
M. M. Stasiulevich, 1901), 421—22; Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 85—87. 
1 0 8 Bobrovnikov, Musul'mane severnogo Kavkaza, 169—70. 
1 0 9 Gen.-Ad"t. K. P. fon-Kaufman, Proekt Vsepoddanneishego otcheta Gen.-Ad"iutanta fon-
Kaufmanapo Grazhdanskomu upravleniiu (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1885), 10. 
1 1 0 Jane Burbank, "Thinking like an Empire: Estate, Law, and Rights in the Early Twentieth 
Century," in Russian Empire, 201; Sergei Abashin, "Obshchina v Turkestane v otsenkakh i 
sporakh russkikh administratorov nachala 80-kh gg. XIX v.," in Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo 
obshchestva 5 (153) (Moscow: Russkaia panorama, 2002), 71—88; Beatrice Penati, "Swamps, 
Sorghum, and Saxauls: Marginal Lands and the Fate of Russian Turkestan (c. 1880—1915)," 
Central Asian Survey 29, 1 (2010): 61—78. 
1 1 1 For an influential view, see L. F. Kostenko, Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenie v nei Russkoi 
grazhdanstvennosti (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1871). 
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replacing it, can be found in the report of Senator Fedor Karlovich Giers, who 
was commissioned by the second governor-general of Turkestan, General 
Mikhail Grigor'evich Cherniaev, to produce recommendations to reform 
Turkestan's governing statute (and, not coincidentally, to blacken the name 
of his hated predecessor, von Kaufman). 
The business of military power is to conquer and pacify a conquered 
region; the further pacification, development, and organization belong 
entirely to the civil power. Military-popular government [voenno-
narodnoe upravlenie] is essential only for the first period after the 
conquest of a country; thereafter, as the region becomes calmer, it slows 
the civil [grazhdanskoe] development of the people. The Turkestan krai, 
as is visible from the above [evidence], is so far pacified that the time has 
come for its further rapprochement [sblizhenie] to Russia by means of 
such unifying of its administration with the general arrangements of the 
empire as are possible.112 
The new Turkestan statute which eventually resulted in 1886 introduced 
elements of the new civil code to Turkestan, but these continued to be 
administered by military courts. It did nothing to dilute the military 
monopoly on administration in the region, let alone bring any closer the 
introduction of civic institutions such as the zemstvos.113 In the end, such 
high-minded sentiments always foundered on pessimism over the cultural 
distance that lay between Russians and Muslims. Daniel Brower's work shows 
clearly how proposals to extend civilian rule and introduce all-imperial norms 
of governance and grazhdanstvennost' were invariably stymied by officers who 
insisted on the maintenance of the priorities of military security—whether 
against Muslim "backwardness" and "fanaticism" or new pan-Turkic and 
pan-Islamic threats.114 This debate became particularly pronounced in the 
aftermath of the Andijan uprising of 1898, when some argued that the revised 
1886 statute of governance had weakened and demilitarized Turkestan's 
administration too much. 1 1 5 The uprising also helped revive the belief that 
Turkestan's Muslims were dangerous "fanatics" and set the cause of civilian 
1 1 2 F. K. Girs, Otchet, revizuiushchego, po Vysochaishemu poveleniiu, Turkestanskogo kraia, 
Tainogo sovetnika Girsa (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1884), 462. 
1 1 3 "Polozhenie ob upravlenii Turkestanskogo Kraia," PSZ 3, no. 3814, 12 June 1886, 318—46. 
1 1 4 Daniel R. Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire (London: Routledge, 
2003), 9—25, 105—6. 
1 1 5 V. P. Sal'kov, "Andizhanskoe Vosstanie" v 1898 g. (Kazan: Tipografiia Imperatorskogo 
universiteta, 1901), 92—93. 
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government back substantially.116 In the very last years of Russian rule, even 
the most liberal officials felt that any real sblizhenie between Russian and 
"native" was as far away as ever.117 
The legal and administrative exclusion of the natives of Central Asia from 
the new civic structures of the Russian state became ever clearer as that state 
sought gradually to modernize itself and introduce wider forms of political 
participation. Muslims in Central Asia were not included in the state's 
putatively universal registers of births, deaths, and marriages, the metrical 
books, as the state-sponsored religious hierarchy needed to administer them 
did not exist in Central Asia.118 The introduction of an individually assessed 
income tax, as Yanni Kotsonis has shown, was intended to play a crucial 
role in ending collective responsibility and turning Russian subjects into 
individual citizens. Although he does not mention Central Asia (where the 
land tax was the main form of assessment), the experience of the Far East, 
where officials decided that Korean and Chinese laborers constituted "half-
persons" for tax purposes, is suggestive.119 More important, perhaps, the 
entire Muslim population of Central Asia (including not only the recently 
conquered sedentary peoples of Turkestan but also the Kazakhs, many of 
whom had been Russian subjects for over 100 years) was exempted from 
the new conscription law of 1874. Though exemption could be regarded as 
a privilege, it also clearly signaled their exclusion from the putative political 
community of the Russian Empire. Miliutin and his fellow-reformers may 
have believed in the power of military assimilation in creating a Russian 
nation, but only up to a point. 1 2 0 This is why, by the early 20th century, 
many Kazakh intellectuals supported the extension of conscription to their 
people in the hope that it would also lead to the extension of the zemstvo to 
their provinces. Governor-General von Kaufman and the military governors 
of the provinces of Turkestan, however, argued that subjecting the Muslim 
1 1 6 For particularly virulent Islamophobia, see E. T. Smirnov, "Dervishizm v Turkestane," and 
"Dzhikhad i Gazavat," in Sbornik materialovpo Musul'manstvu, 1, ed. V. I . Iarovoi-Rabskii (St. 
Petersburg: M. Rosenoer, 1899), 49-71, 101-28; and M. A. Miropiev, Opolozhenii russkikh 
inorodtsev (St. Petersburg: Sinodal'naia tipografiia, 1901). 
1 1 7 N. S. Lykoshin, Rezultaty sblizheniia russkikh s tuzemtsami (Tashkent [?]: n.p., 1903); 
Lykoshin, Pol zhizni v Turkestane: Ocherki byta tuzemnogo naseleniia (Petrograd: V. A. 
Berezovskii, 1916), 5-16; V. P. Nalivkin, Tuzemtsy, ran'she i teper' (Tashkent: A. Kirsner, 
1913), 69. 
1 1 8 Paul Werth, "In the State's Embrace? Civil Acts in an Imperial Order," Kritika 7, 3 (2006): 
441-42. 
1 1 9 Kotsonis, " 'Face-to-Face,' " 241-43; Kotsonis, " 'No Place to Go,' " 556-58. 
1 2 0 Joshua Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass 
Politics, 1905-1925 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 9-14, 21. 
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population of the region to military service would simply supply training and 
leadership for future insurrections against Russian rule; even in the steppe, 
officials felt that the Kazakhs were too distant from grazhdanstvennost'}lx In 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, this reluctance to conscript inorodtsy 
was reinforced by the supposedly scientific work of military anthropologists, 
which alleged their lack of martial qualities when compared to Russians.122 
The eventual promulgation of a conscription ukaz in Central Asia in July 1916 
(even then only for Muslims to serve in labor battalions, not on equal terms) 
did indeed provoke widespread armed rebellion, although this was as much a 
pent-up response to wartime tax increases and the increasing encroachment 
of Russian settlers as it was to military service itself. 
If conscription, registration, and taxation can all be seen as oppressive or 
coercive functions of the modern state from which Russia's colonial subjects 
might have been happy to be free, the restriction of the state's gaze in these 
regions also led to a restriction ofrights ofparticipation in the empire's fledgling 
democratic institutions. Municipal government was extended to the largest 
cities in Muslim regions only in the late 1870s, and in Baku and Tashkent 
the franchise was carefully manipulated to ensure Russian preponderance.123 
In the latter city, the Muslim population paid the bulk of the taxes, but 
these were largely spent on tramways and lighting in the European Nouvelle 
Ville, which was distinct from the native city.124 With the more significant 
extensions of political rights in the Russian Empire after the 1905 October 
Manifesto, inequalities were thrown into even sharper relief. The Muslims 
of the Russian Empire were granted 36 seats in the new State Duma, but in 
Turkestan Russians and "natives" were divided into separate constituencies, 
and even though the latter made up over 90 percent of the population, 
they elected just six deputies, while the Russian population elected seven. 
The franchise was strictly limited to those with property and knowledge of 
Russian; and elections were indirect, through four stages rather than two as 
in European Russia.125 Some of the liberals in Tashkent who had campaigned 
vociferously for universal secret, equal, and direct suffrage were troubled but 
1 2 1 Uyama, "A Particularist Empire," 25, 40-44. 
1 2 2 Mogil'ner, Homo imperii, 337-446. 
1 2 3 Mostashari, On the Religious Frontier, 69-70. 
1 2 4 Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 83, 94-95; David Saunders thus misses the point 
somewhat when he says that without the Russian conquest in 1865, there would have been no 
tramways in Tashkent ("Regional Diversity," 156): it was the native population who paid for 
them and the European settlers who principally benefited. 
1 2 5 Adeeb Khalid, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 233-35. 
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eventually reconciled the results with their consciences by reasoning that 
the Muslim population of the region was extremely reactionary and would 
probably vote for conservatives if given equal rights.126 In any case, the First 
Duma was dissolved before elections could be held in Turkestan. After the 
dissolution of the Second Duma, these seats were abolished; and Turkestan 
and the Stepnoi krai were denied representation altogether. Only ten Muslim 
deputies were elected to the Third Duma, and seven to the Fourth, five of 
whom were Tatars.127 Turkestanis were not indifferent to political exclusion: 
in 1908, some of the inhabitants of Samarkand protested against their lack 
of representation in the Third Duma in a petition submitted to Count 
Konstantin Konstantinovich von der Pahlen's reforming commission, in which 
they stated that the few Muslim deputies from other regions were unable to 
represent them adequately, their way of life being quite different from that of 
other Muslims of the empire.128 Pahlen did propose the extension of civilian 
administration to Turkestan, and even of zemstvos with a preponderant 
official element.129 He too, however, viewed Turkestan as a colonial region 
with particular, colonial problems, writing, "her governmental needs are very 
different from those which come to be applied in the heart of the empire," and 
suggesting that the region should be given greater administrative autonomy 
as a "colony within the empire" along the lines of British India. 1 3 0 In any 
case, these proposals were blocked by the determination of the local military 
bureaucracy to maintain its monopoly on administration, and of the Central 
Administration for Agriculture and Land Management (Glavnoe upravlenie 
zemledeliia i zemleustroistva) to bring about a more "rational" exploitation 
of Turkestan's resources through an accelerated program of Russian peasant 
1 2 6 Sahadeo, Russian Colonial Society, 139—41. 
1 2 7 R. A. Tsiuniuk, "Razvitie politicheskoi zhizni musul'manskikh narodov Rossiiskoi imperii 
i deiatel'nosti musul'manskoi fraktsii v Gosudarstvennoi dume Rossii 1906—1917 gg.," in 
Imperskii stroi Rossii, 201—2, 211. 
1 2 8 "Petitsiia tuzemtsev g. Samarkanda i uezda," 10 October 1908, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi 
istoricheskii arkhiv (RGIA) f. 1396, "Reviziia Senatora Palena K. K. Turkestanskogo Kraia v 
1908—1910 g.," op. 1, d. 264, l l . 230—37ob. (http://zerrspiegel.orientphil.uni-halle.de/t896. 
html, accessed 5 October 2010). 
1 2 9 This provoked considerable disquiet, as the official press warned that the native population 
was still too backward and, above all, too "unknown" for such innovations to be risked. See 
Golovin, "O vvedenii zemstva v Turkestane," Turkestanskie vedomosti, nos. 15—18 (1910), in 
Turkestanskii sbornik 535: 47—57. 
1 3 0 Senator Graf K. K. Palen, Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska, soderzhashchie glavneishie vyvody 
otcheta (St. Petersburg: Senatskaia tipografiia, 1910), 12. 
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resettlement (pereselenie), part of what Willard Sunderland has referred to as 
the "colonialization" of Asiatic Russia in the later 19th century.131 
In no other area, perhaps, was the inequality of rights between Russians 
and "natives" within the empire as clear as in pereselenie, which was clearly 
predicated on the idea that Russians (or, more broadly, Europeans) had a 
preeminent right to the empire's land, one that trumped the rights of the 
native population in Turkestan and the Stepnoi krai. Pereselenie primarily 
affected the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, who saw their pasturelands eroded by 
colonization and who, as they turned to settled agriculture, competed 
increasingly fiercely with arriving colonists for arable land and water.132 Peter 
Holquist has recently referred to a "technocratic ideology" developing within 
the institutional culture of the Resettlement Administration, where the liberal 
or even revolutionary ideals of its officials helped generate a ruthless attitude 
toward the "backwardness" of nomadic pastoralists.133 Aleksandr Arkad'evich 
Kaufman, the doyen of Russian agronomists and resettlement experts, was 
also a leading light of the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party and saw 
no contradiction between its platform of securing legal and political rights for 
the population of the empire at large and the expropriation of the Kazakhs. 
He dismissed Kazakh representatives in the Kadet Party as self-interested 
"bais and sultans" and simply refused to recognize their claim to the land.1 3 4 
Both pereselenie and a democratic constitution could be harnessed to a 
particular idea of "progress"; and in any case, he and most other officials of 
the Resettlement Administration shared the assumption that the good of the 
empire was synonymous with the good of the Russian "nation." As Georgii 
Gins, perhaps the most prominent of the young "technocrats" identified by 
Holquist, put it in a response to a new draft water law for Turkestan in 1911: 
The slow growth in the numbers of the Russian population of the region 
has long given the advantage to the conservative tendency over that of 
1 3 1 Willard Sunderland, "The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never 
Was but Might Have Been," Slavic Review 69, 1 (2010): 120-50. See also Brower, Turkestan, 
140^5. 
1 3 2 Martin, Law and Custom, 72-73; Stephen Sabol, Russian Colonization and the Genesis of 
Kazakh National Consciousness (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 42-44. 
1 3 3 Peter Holquist, " 'In Accord with State Interests and the People's Wishes': The Technocratic 
Ideology of Imperial Russia's Resettlement Administration," Slavic Review 69, 1 (2010): 
151-79. 
1 3 4 A dispute between Kaufman and the Kazakh lawyer Zhikhansha Seidalin on this 
question was played out in the pages of the Kadet newspaper Rech': A. Kaufman, "Kirgizy 
i Konstitutsionno-demokraticheskaia partiia," Rech', no. 11 (5 March 1906); Zh. Seidalin, 
"Kirgizskii vopros?" Rech', no. 27 (21 March 1906); and A. Kaufman, "K kirgizskomu 
voprosu!" Rech , no. 32 (27 March 1906). 
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cultural constructiveness and ofAsiaticness [here Gins used the pejorative 
term Aziiatshchinaa] over European influences. This is why, while we 
relate to the native population with complete goodwill, we cannot fail to 
repeat that limits must be placed upon the further expansion of the area 
of native agriculture, and that everything remaining beyond these limits 
must be transferred to the Russian population.1 3 5 
The new water law, eventually passed in 1916, was designed to break the 
control that the local population still retained over the distribution of water 
and to facilitate the activities of private enterprise in irrigating expropriated 
"state land" to render it suitable for Russian settlement.136 In a well-known 
report on the future of the "colony," as he called it, based on a visit to Turkestan 
in 1912, Gins's superior, Aleksandr Vasil'evich Krivoshein, envisaged far more 
extensive programs for peasant resettlement and the agrarian exploitation of 
Central Asia than had ever before been contemplated. He also contradicted 
the Pahlen Commission in saying that military rule had hitherto had no 
adverse effects on the economic development of the region and that it should 
be preserved for the time being: 
The question of the substitution of military with general civil rule 
[obshchegrazhdanskoe] in Turkestan or the proposal of Count Pahlen 
for the introduction of zemstvos to the region appears distant and 
comparatively minor. Both the former and the latter reform are matters 
for the future. Both are useful, good, and beneficial, but only with a 
sufficient Russian population in the region.1 3 7 
Turkestan's Russianness, and therefore its right to the institutions of the 
European provinces of the empire, would be determined by the number of 
Russian settlers with which the state could flood it: the "natives" could not 
be trusted. The brutal suppression of the 1916 revolt rendered this exclusion 
still clearer. The "solution" proposed by the last governor-general, Aleksei 
Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, to the inter-ethnic violence that had broken out 
between natives and settlers in Semirech'e would have been little short 
1 3 5 G. Gins, "Usloviia orosheniia i ekspluatatsii chastnymi predprinimateliami svobodnykh 
zemel' Turkestana i Zakavkaz'ia," Voprosy kolonizatsii, no. 8 (1911): 251. 
1 3 6 And not, as has recently been suggested, to restrict private control over water in favor of 
a newly minted notion of "public property." See Ekaterina Pravilova, "Les res publicae russes: 
Discours sur la propriete publique a la fin de l'empire," Annales des hautes etudes en sciences 
sociales, no. 3 (2009): 592—93; See also "Zakonoproekt Glavnogo upravleniia zemleustroistva 
i zemledeliia po otdelu zemel'nykh uluchshenii, o proizvodstve za schet chastnykh sredstv 
orositel'nykh rabot v Turkestane," Voprosy kolonizatsii, no. 14 (1914): 222—26. 
1 3 7 A. V. Krivoshein, Zapiska Glavnoupravliaiushchego zemleustroistvom i zemledeliem opoezdke 
v Turkestanskii krai v 1912godu (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia tipografiia, 1912), 78. 
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of apartheid: the creation of an all-Russian district in the fertile region 
around Lake Issyk-Kul and the deportation of its Kyrgyz population to a 
mountainous Bantustan in the region of Naryn. 1 3 8 The February Revolution 
brought a halt to these plans, but it also provided a further test of Russian 
settler attitudes; the Provisional Government in Petrograd granted full 
citizenship to the native population, introducing zemstvos and municipal 
government and allowing the region equal representation in the proposed 
Constituent Assembly.139 Even liberal and revolutionary Russians objected, 
asking for special exemptions, such as separate dumas for the Russian and 
native quarters of cities and separate electorates to the assembly to ensure 
preponderant Russian representation. The justification was ostensibly neither 
racial nor religious but developmental: the tuzemtsy were as yet unready for 
self-government. This argument was also reflected in the first decree of the 
Tashkent soviet after the October Revolution, which barred Muslims from 
admission among its delegates on the grounds that they had not yet developed 
a proletariat.140 The attempt by the Turkestan Bolsheviks to establish what 
would have been a settler-controlled state eventually had to be suppressed by 
forces sent from Moscow.141 
The widespread assumption among historians that the assimilation of 
the peoples and territories of the empire into a single administrative and 
cultural whole was the ultimate aim of Russian imperialism thus needs to be 
substantially qualified. Peter Waldron suggests that Russia's rulers regarded 
all borderland regions "as areas to be assimilated into the metropolitan 
state, rather than colonies to be subdued."142 For Anatolyi Remnev, "the 
Russian imperial project envisaged the gradual absorption of the periphery 
by the Imperial core," largely by means of peasant colonization, which he 
characterizes as "a cardinal difference between the Russian Empire and the 
1 3 8 P. Galuzo, ed., "Vosstanie 1916 g. v Srednei Azii," Krasnyi arkhiv 34 (1929): 60. 
1 3 9 Veselovskii, Zemstvo i zemskaia reforma, 29, 33, 44; he noted that special arrangements 
would be needed in nomadic regions, in particular because of the poor relations which existed 
between the local population and the settlers. 
1 4 0 Adeeb Khalid, "Tashkent 1917: Muslim Politics in Revolutionary Turkestan," Slavic 
Review 55, 2 (1996): 279-80; Marko Buttino, Revoliutsiia naoborot: Sredniaia Aziia mezhdu 
padeniem tsarskoi imperii i obrazovaniem SSSR (Moscow: Zven'ia, 2007), 204-9. 
1 4 1 Dov Yaroshevski, "Russian Regionalism in Turkestan," Slavonic and East European Review 
65, 1 (1987): 77-100, gives an account of this episode, in which Muslims and their exclusion 
from the "regional" particularist politics of the new Turkestan Republic are rather invisible. 
1 4 2 Waldron, Governing Tsarist Russia, 138. 
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Western colonial empires."143 The appropriation of territory and erasure 
of cultures and peoples through settler colonialism is, of course, hardly a 
peculiarly Russian characteristic. Beyond this, however, similar projects of 
assimilation to the metropole through colonization existed in both the British 
and French empires, most obviously in the cases of Ireland and Algeria. 
Both empires also saw more ambitious attempts to create wider unions: in 
the British case by drawing the white settler dominions into union with the 
"mother country" under a single imperial Parliament, an idea popularized 
by Sir John Seeley in his 1883 classic, The Expansion of England, but which 
remained current well into the 1930s.144 In the French case, the legacy of the 
postwar attempt to assimilate colonies to the metropole can still be seen in 
the anomalous presence of Reunion, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French 
Guyana on euro currency notes: they remain metropolitan French territory to 
this day. The difference was therefore not qualitative; it was simply that in the 
British and French case ambition far outstripped political and demographic 
realities and was unable to overcome cultural and geographical distance. This 
was true for some parts of the Russian Empire as well. Remnev's model makes 
sense for Siberia, where the complete cultural Russification of the territory 
through colonization was more or less complete by the beginning of the 
20th century. As Willard Sunderland has shown, a similar process took place 
on the steppes of what would become southern Ukraine, although here the 
European culture that overlaid earlier nomadic memories was rather more 
cosmopolitan.145 On the Asian steppe, however, it proved a much more 
distant goal; and in Turkestan the aim of assimilation was so repeatedly 
postponed as to become effectively a dead letter. Instead, as we have seen, 
the final years of tsarism saw a much more aggressive policy of Russian 
settlement and economic exploitation proposed for the region, which was 
explicitly described as a "colony."146 Mark Bassin has suggested that unlike 
the vision of British imperial unity sketched out by Seeley in The Expansion 
of England, which excluded India, the tsarist empire had a "commitment to 
equal enfranchisement" which extended across all the empire's borderlands, 
1 4 3 A. V. Remnev, "Siberia and the Russian Far East in the Imperial Geography of Power," in 
Russian Empire, 440-41. 
1 4 4 On this point, see Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World 
Order, 1860-1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
1 4 5 Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
1 4 6 Krivoshein, Zapiska, 70; David Mackenzie, "Turkestan's Significance to Russia," Russian 
Review 33, 2 (1974): 182; S. N. Abashin, D. Iu. Arapov, and N. E. Bekmakhanova, eds., 
Tsentral'naia Aziia v sostave Rossiiskoi imperii (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2008), 
328-29; Sunderland, "The Ministry of Asiatic Russia." 
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including Turkestan, but this is surely exaggerated.147 Just as Seeley excluded 
India, so Central Asia remained a land apart, both in the Russian imperial 
imagination and, more important, in legal and administrative terms; it was 
regarded as inassimilable until the fall of tsarism. 
There are also limitations to Burbank's model of an "Imperial Rights 
Regime." She is certainly right to warn us against the assumption that in the 
19th century, regimes that claimed to espouse equal rights were necessarily any 
more just and humane than Russia, whose rather ramshackle system included 
separate courts for peasants and the exemption of "aliens" from the burden 
of military service. The example of British India, where in theory the rule of 
law was applied uniformly, is a clear enough reminder of that.1 4 8 However, in 
the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century, a definite pattern 
emerged, as certain rights were gradually extended at the center but withheld 
from the majority of the empire's "Asiatic" subjects because of their perceived 
underdevelopment. Russia's liberals dreamt of universal and equal imperial 
citizenship, but many of them became uneasy when it was suggested that 
this could be extended to more "backward" peoples or ignored the degree to 
which this task was complicated by the diversity of the empire's population.149 
The imperial Russian state at times withheld and distributed political rights 
according to religious, cultural, or even ethnic criteria.150 It did not do so as 
consistently as the West European empires, but in some respects it, too, made 
the same distinctions between metropole and colony, between a European (if 
not Russian) ruling class, and the Asiatic masses, and, as Alexei Miller and 
Leonid Gorizontov have argued, between a truly Russian, national territory 
and areas that would always be inassimilable.151 Just how this tendency would 
have developed had it not been for the October Revolution is unclear: the 
1 4 7 Bassin, "Geographies of Imperial Identity," 57—58. 
1 4 8 Burbank, "An Imperial Rights Regime," 398—99. In India, admittedly, a version of what 
we might call a variable rights regime also existed, in the form of codes of Hindu and Muslim 
personal law that were incorporated into the Indian Penal Code, but in principle at least 
British Indian subjects had more personal rights and greater equality and protection before the 
law than Russian subjects did. This did not prevent the government of India from being an 
unrepresentative and despotic regime that privileged Englishmen. 
1 4 9 See Eric Lohr's discussion of the ideas of the liberal jurist V. M. Gessen in "The Ideal 
Citizen and Real Subject in Late Imperial Russia," Kritika 7, 2 (2006): 189—90. 
1 5 0 Apart from the Jewish case discussed in Avrutin, "Racial Categories and the Politics of 
(Jewish) Difference," 13—40, Charles Steinwedel argues convincingly that the tsarist state did 
constitute and then use categories of ethnicity in Bashkiria from the 1890s onward ("To Make 
a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russian Politics, 1861—1917," in 
Russian Modernity, 68—70, 73—75). 
1 5 1 Alexei Miller, The Romanov Empire and Nationalism (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2008), 161—79; Leonid Gorizontov, "The 'Great Circle' of Interior Russia: 
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tension that emerged in 1917 between a liberal regime at the center and 
European settlers in Central Asia anxious to preserve or extend their privileges 
is more than a little reminiscent of the later divisions between metropolitan 
France and the pieds-noirs of Algeria, or the events that led to the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by settlers in Rhodesia. 
The division between metropole and colony within the British and French 
empires and their failure and unwillingness to develop a genuine form of 
imperial citizenship are so well known as to be entirely uncontroversial. For 
the Russian Empire, despite the volume of high-quality scholarship that has 
recently been produced on Russian imperialism, the division remains much less 
well understood. I would suggest that this is, at least in part, because Russia's 
"imperial turn" coincided, more or less, with the wider "cultural turn" in the 
history of imperialism and colonialism. As Laura Engelstein has suggested, a 
relentless focus on supposedly stable cultural formations can blind historians 
to processes of change.152 In the case of the British Empire, the "cultural 
turn" in the history of imperialism from the late 1970s onward, despite its 
more incomprehensible excesses, was by and large a welcome corrective and 
supplement to what had gone before. Traditional historiography, exemplified 
in the old Cambridge History of the British Empire, was heavily political, with 
a relentless focus on structures of governance and, in particular, a deceptive 
portrayal of smooth constitutional progress toward self-government and 
independence in British colonies.153 That historiography did, however, at least 
banish any doubt as to the legal status of the different parts of the empire or the 
varying political rights of its citizens. The historiography of the Russian Empire 
was never blessed with such an embarrassment of riches. One consequence is that 
the first generation of English-language monographs on Russian imperialism 
that appeared from 1991 onward has left an admirable superstructure of cultural 
history—in particular, the history of national and religious identities and of 
Islamic reformism—without establishing solid foundations in the history of the 
military, bureaucracy, taxation, and other institutions of the Russian Empire.154 
Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," in 
Russian Empire, 67-93. 
1 5 2 Laura Engelstein, "Culture, Culture Everywhere: Interpretations of Modern Russia across 
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As Kimitaka Matsuzato has put it, thanks to Andreas Kappeler's pioneering 
work we have a much better understanding of the Russian Empire as a multi¬
ethnic polity, but should we really be thinking of it in those terms at all, given 
how many of these "ethnicities" seem to have been at least partially constructed 
in the early Soviet period? Instead, he has urged that much greater attention 
be paid to the actual administrative units into which the empire was divided: 
provinces, oblasts, uezds, eparchates, and, more broadly, areas under civilian 
and under military rule.155 
Naturally the legal, political, and administrative cannot be separated 
from the cultural when we try to understand divisions and inequalities: as we 
have seen, it was a developmental understanding of humanity closely akin to 
British or French attitudes which led the Russian state to restrict the rights 
it gave to its Asian subjects because they were "backward" and to Jews and 
the peoples of the western borderlands because they were "untrustworthy." 
For precisely this reason, however, such cultural justifications for inequality 
are a phenomenon easily comprehensible to all historians of 19th-century 
imperialism. The complexities and specificities of the legal and administrative 
regimes of the Russian Empire, in contrast, can only really be analyzed and 
explained by those who specialize in its history, or indeed in the history of 
particular regions within it. The process of writing this article and listening 
to the criticisms of other scholars revealed the enormous number of local 
variations which existed even among zemstvo provinces, or between different 
areas under voenno-narodnoe upravlenie. Just as it is easy for a historian of 
European Russia to overlook the colonial nature ofTurkestan's administration, 
so (as I have discovered) a historian of Turkestan can easily fail to appreciate 
the differences that existed between the military regime there and that in 
the steppe governor-generalship, can mistakenly assume that Kazan and Ufa 
provinces were governed under the same legal regime, or lump the Volga-Ural 
region together with the western borderlands as part of a single, European 
"metropole." If the Russian Empire lacked the bewildering heterogeneity of 
the British, with its patchwork of self-governing dominions, crown colonies, 
and protectorates, it had more subtle variations of its own, which are often 
very difficult to grasp. 
Finally, this complex picture of pluralism and inequality has implications 
for our understanding not just of the tsarist state but of the Soviet regime that 
followed it. After 1917, even the most "backward" peoples of the Russian 
Empire would become full Soviet citizens—however empty that title may 
have been, it was equally empty for all nationalities and all territories. Instead, 
1 5 5 Matsuzato, "General-gubernatorstva," 427-32, 456-58. 
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party members of whatever nationality received certain privileges, while those 
designated as class enemies, such as the Cossacks or the Central Asian ulama, 
were excluded from the Soviet political community (though sometimes, of 
course, as with the Poles in the 1930s or the Chechens in the 1940s, this logic 
was applied to particular peoples). This commitment to a single citizenship 
existed precisely because the Soviet Union was far more ambitious and 
ruthless in its plans to modernize its subjects and remake them anew than 
the tsarist empire had ever been: in this, as in other respects, it more closely 
resembled the contemporary modernizing regimes in Turkey and Iran than 
it did its predecessor.156 In other areas, there were continuities, but there is a 
distinction between a tsarist state which distributed rights, obligations, and 
civic participation unequally among different peoples and territories and a 
Soviet Union whose vision of citizenship, and the citizens it was supposed to 
create, was universal. 
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